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I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The mysterious and elusive form of energy we call electricity
* B.A. 1952, Washington and Jefferson College; LL.B. 1956, Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh School of Law; 1956-58, Clerk to Chief Judge Austin
Stanley, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
has an awesome capacity for causing injury and death.' It has con-
sequently been the frequent subject of litigation in Pennsylvania.
Because of the hazard inherent in the production and use of
electricity, the courts have imposed stringent standards of care on
the conduct of its producers and users. This is generally in keeping
with the axiom that vigilence must always be commensurate with
danger and that a high degree of danger always calls for a high
degree of care.
2
The leading case in Pennsylvania on the subject of electrical
injuries and the duty of electric companies is Fitzgerald v. Edison
Electric Co.3 The following general rule was announced:
Wires charged with an electric current may be harm-
less, or they may be in the highest degree dangerous. The
difference in this respect is not apparent to ordinary ob-
servation, and the public, therefore, while presumed to
know that danger may be present, are not bound to know
its degree in any particular case. The company, however,
which uses such a dangerous agent is bound not only to
know the extent of the danger, but to use the very highest
degree of care practicable to avoid injury to every one who
may be lawfully in proximity to its wires and liable to come
accidentally or otherwise in contact with them.
4
The rule requiring the very highest degree of care practicable has
been frequently repeated in various cases.5
Another expression of the general rule, recognizing the poten-
1. Electricity has been referred to by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court as "one of the most dangerous agencies known to man." Sebok v.
Pennsylvania Edison Co., 331 Pa. 524, 527, 1 A.2d 680, 682 (1938). Elec-
tricity "wields a force capable of illuminating the world, propelling ma-
chines of fabulous complexity, transporting incalculable weights, and de-
stroying or crippling life." Cooper v. Heintz Mfg. Co., 385 Pa. 296, 298,
122 A.2d 699, 700 (1956). For an interesting early definition of electricity,
see Commonwealth v. Northern Elec. Light & Power Co., 145 Pa. 105,
118, 22 A. 839, 840 (1891).
2. Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 385 Pa. .520, 536, 123
A.2d 636, 645 (1956); Cooper v. Heintz Mfg. Co., 385 Pa. 296, 304, 122 A.2d
699, 703 (1956); MacDougall v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 311 Pa.
387, 396, 166 A. 589, 592 (1933).
3. 200 Pa. 540, 50 A. 161 (1901).
4. Id. at 543, 50 A. at 161-62.
5. Thompson v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 402 F.2d 88, 90 (3d Cir.
1968); Kube v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 390 F.2d 506, 509 (3d Cir. 1968); Le-
beck v. William A. Jarvis, Inc., 250 F.2d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 1957); Hamilton
v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 179, 182 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Meehan v. Phila-
delphia Elec. Co., 424 Pa. 51, 53, 225 A.2d 900, 902 (1967); Stark v. Lehigh
Foundries, Inc., 388 Pa. 1, 8-9, 130 A.2d 123, 128 (1957); Brillhart v. Edison
Light & Power Co., 368 Pa. 307, 312, 82 A.2d 44, 47 (1951); Kaufman v.
Pittsburgh Ry., 363 Pa. 96, 100, 69 A.2d 90, 92 (1949); Commonwealth Trust
Co. v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Co., 353 Pa. 150, 153, 44 A.2d 594, 596 (1945);
Shapiro v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 342 Pa. 416, 419, 21 A.2d 26, 28 (1941);
Sebok v. Pennsylvania Edison Co., 331 Pa. 524, 527-28, 1 A.2d 680, 682
(1938); Ashby v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 328 Pa. 474, 478, 195 A. 887, 889
(1938); Markovich v. Jefferson Corp., 146 Pa. Super. 108, 111-12, 22 A.2d 65,
67 (1941).
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tial harm of electricity, is quoted in Ashby v. Philadelphia Electric
Co.:" "When human life is at stake, the rule of due care and dili-
gence requires everything that gives reasonable promise of its pres-
ervation to be done, regardless of difficulties or expense."'7 It has
also been said that "every reasonable precaution suggested by
experience and the known dangers of the subject ought to be
taken."
The general rules of conduct governing the use of electricity
have been applied in a variety of ways to the countless factual situ-
ations giving rise to electrical injuries. These factual situations
will be discussed in this Article.
HI. INSULATION
Electric companies have a duty to insulate their wires at
places where persons may come lawfully in proximity to them.9
Although it has been said that a corollary duty is to keep the in-
sulation safe "by constant oversight and repair," 10 the mandate
has been interpreted to require only a "reliable inspection.""'  If
insulation becomes defective, it is necessary to prove that the
owner of the line had actual notice or that the insulation was de-
fective for a long enough time to charge the owner with construc-
tive notice.
12
In Fitzgerald v. Edison Electric Co.,' 3 the company was deemed
to have notice of defective insulation by the fact that the wire was
6. 328 Pa. 474, 195 A. 887 (1938).
7. Id. at 478, 195 A. at 889; accord, Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power &
Light Co., 385 Pa. 520, 545, 123 A.2d 636, 650 (1956); Cooper v. Heintz Mfg.
Co., 385 Pa. 296, 304, 122 A.2d 699, 703 (1956); Brillhart v. Edison Light &
Power Co., 368 Pa. 307, 312, 82 A.2d 44, 47 (1951); Commonwealth Trust
Co. v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Co., 353 Pa. 150, 153, 44 A.2d 594, 596 (1945).
8. Brillhart v. Edison Light & Power Co., 368 Pa. 307, 313, 82 A.2d
44, 48 (1951); accord, Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 330, 191
A.2d 822, 826 (1963).
9. Meehan v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 424 Pa. 51, 54-55, 225 A.2d 900,
902 (1967); Brillhart v. Edison Light & Power Co., 368 Pa. 307, 312, 82 A.2d
44, 47 (1951); Shapiro v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 342 Pa. 416, 419, 21 A.2d
26, 27-28 (1941) (citing Mullen v. Wilkes-Barre G. & E. Co., 229 Pa. 54, 77
A. 1108 (1910) ); Fitzgerald v. Edison Elec. Co., 200 Pa. 540, 543, 50 A.
161, 162 (1901).
10. Fitzgerald v. Edison Elec. Co., 200 Pa. 540, 543, 50 A. 161, 162 (1901).
11. Meehan v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 424 Pa. 51, 225 A.2d 900 (1967):
"Inspection must encompass a serious, sincere, sufficient scrutinization
to ascertain defects before it can be regarded a reliable inspection." Id.
at 55, 225 A.2d at 903.
12. Kaufman v. Pittsburgh Ry., 363 Pa. 96, 100, 69 A.2d 90, 92 (1949);
Smith v. East End Elec. Co., 198 Pa. 19, 47 A. 1123 (1901).
13. Fitzgerald v. Edison Elec. Co., 200 Pa. 540, 543-44, 50 A. 161, 162
(1901).
"spitting fire" when blown against the corner of a roof, and that
this condition persisted for several weeks. In another case,14 the
company failed in its duty of reasonable inspection where insula-
tion deteriorated from long exposure to the weather, causing a fire
which damaged merchandise. 15 Likewise, a company will not be
heard to say it made an inspection one day before an accident,
where an electrician brushed against a wire from which the insula-
tion broke off, causing him injury.16
It is common practice in Pennsylvania for electric companies
to string uninsulated high tension transmission lines at such a
height from the ground and over such land that injury from the
lines is highly unlikely. However, in Markovich v. Jefferson
Corp.,1 7 the company was held to be negligent for maintaining an
uninsulated high voltage line near a commonly used path when the
line was brought down by the fall of a dead tree, electrocuting a
16 year old boy using the path. There was expert testimony that
the wire situated near the path should have been insulated.
In Brilihart v. Edison Light & Power Co.,"8 plaintiff's decedent
was electrocuted when he was installing a pipe in a well-pump lo-
cated in a pump-house building. The pipe contacted an electric
line 10 feet over the building. Although liability seemed to be
predicated on testimony that the line should have been at a mini-
mum of 18 feet over the building, the court commented that it is
frequently negligent not to insulate wires placed near a building.' 9
If the electric company has no reason to believe anyone would
come near its line at the place where the accident occurred, it is not
held to be a guarantor of perfect insulation.
20
Insulation might be proper where wires hang out of ordinary
reach, but inadequate where wires enter buildings.
21
It has even been stated that a company should not rely on mere
insulation alone to insure safety of the public where the voltage
is very high, but that lines should be so placed as to obviate the
likelihood of human contact.
22
A telephone company has the duty to see that no electric cur-
rent passes over its wires and to keep the wires properly insulated
14. Kaufman v. Pittsburgh Ry., 363 Pa. 96, 69 A.2d 90 (1949).
15. Id. at 99-100, 69 A.2d at 92.
16. Meehan v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 424 Pa. 51, 225 A.2d 900 (1967).
17. 146 Pa. Super. 108, 22 A.2d 65 (1941).
18. 368 Pa. 307, 82 A.2d 44 (1951).
19. Id. at 312, 82 A.2d at 47; accord, Wood v. Seifert, 3 Adams L.J. 7
(Pa. C.P. 1961).
20. Matlack v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 312 Pa. 206, 167 A. 37
(1933).
21. Yeager v. Edison Elec. Co., 242 Pa. 101, 104-05, 88 A. 872, 873
(1913).
22. Geroski v. Allegheny County Light Co., 247 Pa. 304, 307-08, 93 A.
338, 339 (1915).
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to prevent such an occurrence.
23
III. LIABILITY OF ELECTRIC COMPANY FROM CONTACT OF CRANE,
DERRICK OR OTHER CONDUCTOR WITH OVERHEAD
TRANSMISSION LINES
Injury and death frequently occur in construction operations
when a person is touching metal or machinery which strikes an
overhead high tension line. This type of accident gives rise to many
cases. The rule involving the highest degree of care practicable
2 4
is cast in terms applying to original construction of the line, in-
cluding minimum clearance from the ground, and reasonable in-
spection from time to time to discover dangerous activities of others
under the lines.
While overhead high tension lines are frequently uninsulated,
they are required to be isolated by height out of the reach of those
whose employment may lawfully bring them into the vicinity. In
Skoda v. West Penn Power Co.,23 the top of a large truck with its
bed extended was 20 to 21 feet from the ground when it made con-
tact with the overhead lines, causing fatal injuries to a worker.
The electric company was held negligent where there was testimony
that the company's own minimum wire clearance specifications re-
quired a height of 22 feet for the type of area in question. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court said:
There is no statutory requirement regulating the mini-
mum height of the high tension wires. In Brillhart v. Edi-
son Light & Power Co., supra, [368 Pa. 307, 313 (1951)]
this Court said: "Although a minimum clearance for high
voltage wires strung over buildings and land has not been
statutorily prescribed, the common usage in the business
is a fair test or standard of care: Maize v. Atlantic Refining
Company, 352 Pa. 51, 57, 41 A.2d 850 .... ",2
In Brillhart v. Edison Light & Power Co.,"7 liability of de-
fendant was predicated on testimony that the line which was con-
tacted by a pipe held by decedent should have been at a minimum
height of 18 feet over the building, instead of only 10 feet.
Where the electric company originally constructed the high
tension lines in a safe and proper manner, it is required to main-
tain them in a safe condition by "reasonable inspections from time
23. Delahunt v. United Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 Pa. 241, 64 A. 515 (1906).
24. Quoted at text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
25. 411 Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963).
26. 411 Pa. 323, 329, 191 A.2d 822, 826 (1963).
27. 368 Pa. 307, 82 A.2d 44 (1951), discussed at text accompanying
notes 18-19 supra.
to time."2 8 Under these circumstances, the power company is neg-
ligent by reason of dangerous activities of third persons only if it
had actual notice of the activities or if the activities persisted for a
sufficient time to charge it with constructive notice. The company
is bound to anticipate only accidents and injuries as it "may reason-
ably forecast as likely to happen.
'2 9
In Reed v. Duquesne Light Co.,3 0 decedent was electrocuted be-
cause he was in contact with a hook and metal sling at the end of
a cable attached to a 65 foot crane. The upper portion of the cable
contacted an uninsulated high tension line suspended 36 feet from
the ground. It was admitted that the original construction of the
line was safe and proper. It was argued that defendant should have
had constructive notice of the dangerous condition created by the
use of tall cranes by decedent's employer in the vicinity of the lines
for a period of six months. It was held, however, that the use of
the cranes near the lines was intermittent, not permanent, and no
constructive notice would be imputed to the company. On the
issue of constructive notice, the court ruled:
. . . Before knowledge of a fault or other condition can be
visited constructively, the situation must not only have
existed a sufficient length of time for its due discovery
but it must also be capable of ascertainment upon the in-
spection, observation or supervision legally required of
the one sought to be bound with such knowledge.81
The court decided that the company was under no "duty to keep
the land underneath the lines under constant surveillance. '32
On the other hand, where the power company knew of the
work involving cranes, moved the lines a safe distance away, then
moved them back before the work was completed, it was held to
have had actual and constructive notice, and the question of its
28. Reed v. Duquesne Light Co., 354 Pa. 325, 329, 47 A.2d 136, 138
(1946); Matlack v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 312 Pa. 206, 210, 167
A. 37, 38 (1933).
29. Mirnek v. West Penn Power Co., 279 Pa. 188, 191, 123 A. 769, 770
(1924); accord, Kronk v. West Penn Power Co., 422 Pa. 458, 222 A.2d 720
(1966): "The general test of liability is whether the injury imputed to the
defendant is such that a person of ordinary intelligence would have fore-
seen it as the natural and probable consequence of his conduct." Id. at 462,
222 A.2d at 721.
30. 354 Pa. 325, 47 A.2d 136 (1946).
31. Id. at 330, 47 A.2d at 139. In Stark v. Lehigh Foundries, Inc., 388
Pa. 1, 12-14, 130 A.2d 123, 131-32 (1957), the power company was similarly
held not to have constructive notice of cranes working only sporadically
under the wires.
The length of time necessary for constructive notice "depends upon
the circumstances of each case, including the place the dangerous condition
exists, population of the neighborhood, the possibility of injury to persons
in the vicinity, etc." Markovich v. Jefferson Corp., 146 Pa. Super. 108, 113,
22 A.2d 65, 67 (1941).
32. Reed v. Duquesne Light Co., 354 Pa. 325, 331, 47 A.2d 136, 139
(1946). See also Matlack v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 312 Pa. 206,
210, 167 A. 37, 38 (1933) ("no duty of continuing inspection").
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negligence was for the jury.3 3
Where the power company is not asked to de-energize the wires
under which the crane is working, and it has neither actual nor
constructive notice, the company is not responsible for the death
occasioned by contact of the crane with safely installed high tension
lines.3
4
Where the activity conducted under the electric lines is in a
rural area where the company could not reasonably anticipate that
persons would come into close proximity with the lines, the com-
pany is not negligent. For example, in Kronk v. West Penn Power
Co.,3 5 a well-driller elected to place his rig beneath a line carrying
4600 volts in a rural area, and was burned when the mast made con-
tact with the line. The line was erected 30 feet above the ground;
it was decided that there was no "obligation to erect facilities in a
rural area high enough above the ground to have rendered im-
possible the accident which occurred or to anticipate plaintiff's
actions."
36
Similarly, an electric company is not responsible for its failure
to anticipate contact with its lines in highly extraordinary ways. 7
However, in the unusual circumstances of an airplane striking a
high tension line 185 feet from the ground, it was held that the
company's negligence was a question for the jury.38
Questions involving contributory negligence and intervening
causes in cases where contact is made with overhead wires will be
discussed subsequently in this Article.
39
33. Ashby v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 328 Pa. 474, 478-79, 195 A. 887,
889 (1938).
34. Luketich v. Duquesne Light Co., 389 Pa. 87, 132 A.2d 268 (1957).
35. 422 Pa. 458, 222 A.2d 720 (1966).
36. Id. at 461, 222 A.2d at 721.
37. Jowett v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 383 Pa. 330, 118 A.2d 452
(1955) (defective coupling caused mast of television antenna to break and
contact wire 22 feet from the peak of the roof of a house and 39 feet from
the ground); Geroski v. Allegheny County Light Co., 247 Pa. 304, 93 A. 338
(1915) (janitor, using copper wire to hoist a flag, manipulated it from
the ground in such manner as to contact electric line 29 feet from the
ground); Trout v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 236 Pa. 506, 84 A. 967 (1912)
(young boy, attempting to detach his kite from an electric line 4 feet from
the cornice of his house, threw a corncob tied to the end of a string over
the wire, drawing the wire to him and caused injuries). See Wright v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 314 Pa. 222, 171 A. 593 (1934); Kosson v. West Penn
Power Co., 293 Pa. 131, 141 A. 734 (1928); Green v. West Penn Rys., 246
Pa. 340, 92 A. 341 (1914).
38. Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 385 Pa. 520, 123 A.2d
636 (1956).
39. Cases involving contributory negligence in the contacting of over-
head wires are discussed at text accompanying notes 97-98, 101, 103, 105-06,
IV. LIABmiTY OF LANDOWNERS AND OTHERS iN ELEcTncAL AccimDE's
Electrical injuries often occur to the employees of independent
contractors hired by the owner or occupier of the land. The very
highest duty of care applies not only to those who produce and
transmit electrical current, but to those who use it and who main-
tain on their land the danger involved in high tension lines.40
An employee of an independent contractor invited to do work
for the landowner is a business visitor.41 The general rule is that
the possessor of the land is required to keep the land in reasonably
safe condition and to warn the business visitor of dangers which the
possessor knows or should know exist.42 Of course, there is no duty
to warn of a danger which is as obvious to the visitor as it is to the
possessor.
43
Where the peril of electric current is present, the duty of the
possessor of land is more easily stated than discharged. When a
workman might be injured by electricity, the possessor is bound by
the familiar principle that when human life is at stake, the stand-
ard of due care requires that everything be done to preserve life,
regardless of expense or difficulty.
44
With this rule in mind, simply warning the contractor and his
employees is inadequate; moreover, numerous warnings were held
to prove that the owner knew of the danger, and where he did
nothing more to eliminate that danger, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Co.,45
held that the company's negligence was a question for the jury.
There are numerous factual situations which suggest what a
defendant can or should do to protect those whose employment
bring them near electric lines: raise the lines out of a position
of danger, when this can be done at the approximate cost of $200; 46
restore a partition walling off a transformer;47 place a guard in or
109-12, 114-15, 117, 121, 124, 127, 130-31 infra. Cases involving intervening
causes in the contacting of overhead wires are discussed at text accom-
panying notes 134-39, 14-46 infra.
40. Cooper v. Heintz Mfg. Co., 385 Pa. 296, 305, 122 A.2d 699, 703
(1956); Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Co., 353 Pa.
150, 153, 44 A.2d 594, 596 (1945).
41. Giannone v. U.S. Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544, 546 (3d Cir. 1956);
Mathis v. Lukens Steel Co., 415 Pa. 262, 264, 203 A.2d 482, 484 (1964);
Stimmel v. Kerr, 394 Pa. 609, 611, 148 A.2d 232, 233 (1959).
42. Stark v. Lehigh Foundries, Inc., 388 Pa. 1, 130 A.2d 123 (1957).
43. Repyneck v. Tarantino, 415 Pa. 92, 95, 202 A.2d 105, 107 (1964).
44. See cases cited note 7 supra.
45. 353 Pa. 150, 153-54, 44 A.2d 594, 596 (1945).
46. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Co., 353 Pa.
150, 154, 44 A.2d 594, 596 (1945); Ashby v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 328 Pa.
474, 479, 195 A. 887, 889 (1938) (company could have moved lines a safe
distance away).
47. Cooper v. Heintz Mfg. Co., 385 Pa. 296, 305, 122 A.2d 699, 703
(1956).
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close to a transformer room; 48 display warning signs;49 and shut
off the power when workers might be injured.50
In Lebeck v. William A. Jarvis, Inc.,51 the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals held a landowner negligent for failure to notify the
electric company that a crane was about to be used under its high
voltage transmission line. Such notice would have allowed the
electric company to have taken steps to protect the workers in-
volved.
In Pennsylvania, there is a specific regulation of the Depart-
ment of Labor and Industry which requires "the contractors or the
property owner" to disconnect electric lines from the outside when
demolition work is being done.52 Such regulations are proper evi-
dence to establish a standard of care.5 3
The landowner-defendant was found negligent in Stark v.
Lehigh Foundries, Inc.,54 when its foreman spotted high cranes
under the electric lines, creating a false sense of security in the
plaintiff, who had a right to assume that the landowner would not
lead him into danger without warning.
The case of Hamilton v. United States5  reviewed the Pennsyl-
vania law governing the landowner's duty concerning electricity
and concluded:
It appears therefore that under Pennsylvania law,
the giving of a warning would not necessarily relieve a
landowner of the charge of negligence, so far as instru-
mentalities carrying electricity are concerned, where some
other course would be practicable and more likely to be
effective in avoiding injury.56
V. BROKEN WIRES
When a person is injured or killed by contacting a broken elec-
tric line, the liability of the electric company may be predicated




51. 250 F.2d 285, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1957).
52. Pa., D.L.I., Regulations for Demolition Work, Rule 3(c) (1968
ed.).
53. Dougherty v. A.M. Uhrik, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1954),
aff'd, 227 F.2d 519 (3d Cir. 1955); Weimer v. Westmoreland Water Co., 127
Pa. Super. 201, 207-08, 193 A. 665, 667-68 (1937).
54. 388 Pa. 1, 9, 130 A.2d 123, 129 (1957).
55. 143 F. Supp. 179 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
56. Id. at 183.
or constructive knowledge of the break followed by failure on the
part of the company to take prompt steps to avoid injury.
A. Break Caused by Company's Negligence
The rule of res ipsa loquitur does not apply upon the mere
showing that an electric wire has broken.57 Where the plaintiff
can present no further evidence, recovery is not permitted.
5 8  It
has been said, however, that the quantum of proof in such a case
is very slight.59
Liability has been predicated on many types of conduct where
broken wires have cause injuries. In Mayhugh v. Somerset Tele-
phone Co.,60 the wire fell because of defendant's negligence in fail-
ing to fasten it properly to the crossarm. In Laudenslager v.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.,61 the wires were improperly
spliced and the distance between poles was too great, causing the
wires to break from their own weight. An expert in Fitzsimmons
v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.6 2 proved negligence by testimony
that the wire had deteriorated, was of poor initial construction,
and was burned where trolley wheels did not make proper con-
tact. Negligence has been established by proof that repeated blows
to a guy wire weakened either an insulator or a wire;6 3 that a de-
fective crossarm caused a wire to break and contact an iron plate
on a sidewalk, injuring plaintiff who stepped on the plate;6 4 and
that a wire proved to be defective before a storm blew it down.65
The ownership of the broken wire is not controlling. "The
danger lay not in the wire, but in the 'subtle fluid' set through it
by the defendant company."66
An unusual factual situation appeared in Sebok v. Pennsyl-
vania Edison Co.67 There, high tension lines sagged four feet
from the top of a frame house. The house caught fire and the
wire was burned through, electrocuting decedent who stepped on
it. Defendant was found negligent for permitting the wires to be
so low that they could be burned by the burning house. A point
57. Lanning v. Pittsburgh Ry., 229 Pa. 575, 577, 79 A. 136 (1911).
58. Kahn v. Kittanning Elec. Light Co., 238 Pa. 70, 85 A. 1117 (1913);
Cavanaugh v. Allegheny County Light Co., 226 Pa. 86, 75 A.. 21 (1909)
(boy of 17 found on sidewalk, his body in contact with defendant's broken
line; cause of break not shown).
59. McCoy v. George, 149 Pa. Super. 630, 633, 27 A.2d 658, 659 (1942);
accord, Dougherty v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 257 Pa. 118, 124, 101
A. 344, 347 (1917).
60. 265 Pa. 498, 109 A. 211 (1920).
61. 312 Pa. 169, 167 A. 778 (1933).
62. 56 Pa. Super. 365 (1914).
63. McCoy v. George, 149 Pa. Super. 630, 27 A.2d 658 (1942).
64. Smith v. Harwood Elec. Co., 255 Pa. 165, 99 A. 473 (1916).
65. Laritza v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 106 Pa. Super. 587, 162 A. 333
(1932).
66. Daltry v. Media Elec. Light Co., 208 Pa. 403, 410, 57 A. 833, 836
(1904).
67. 331 Pa. 524, 1 A.2d 680 (1938).
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was also made that the substation did not have sufficient circuit
breakers to disconnect the current in the event of a break.
In Dillon v. Alegheny County Light Co.,68 defendant company's
negligence consisted in permitting an unused, uninsulated telephone
line to remain on its poles for many years, knowing that it might
break and fall across a live wire, carrying current to the ground.
A police officer was killed trying to remove the wire to a place of
safety.
In Dugan v. Erie County Electric Co.,69 a telephone company
placed a slack guy wire in such a position that wind blew it against
one of defendant's electric lines completing a circuit and causing
the electric wire to be burned in half. The guy wire was placed
without consent of the electric company. Decedent's hand came in
contact with the broken electric wire as it blew back and forth
three inches above the pavement. It was held that the electric com-
pany had a duty to inspect to discover the faulty guy wire; whether
its inspection was proper was held to be a jury question.
B. Actual or Constructive Knowledge of the Broken Wire
Where a wire is broken through no fault or neglect of the elec-
tric company, the company still has the duty to act promptly to re-
move the danger created by the fallen wire.
Failure to act after actual notice is the clearest example of
negligence. In Devlin v. Beacon Light Co.,70 defendant's workers
were making alterations on the lines and left a charged wire with-
out any guard or warning. Plaintiff was injured by stepping on
the wire. The court decided that defendant had been negligent.
A municipality was held liable for maintaining unsafe streets in
Davis v. Stowe Township.7 1 There a pedestrian was killed at 6:15
a.m., when he touched a guy wire electrified by a defectively in-
sulated electric line. Three or four township policemen saw the
fallen wire sparking on the street at 5:00 a.m., and did nothing to
remove the danger. It was there indicated that the stringent rules
governing the conduct of electric companies applied also to munici-
pal corporations. In Sorrell v. Titusville Electric Traction Co., 72 a
68. 179 Pa. 482, 36 A. 164 (1897).
69. 241 Pa. 259, 88 A. 437 (1913).
70. 192 Pa. 188, 190, 43 A. 962, 963 (1899) ("... the evidence tended
strongly to prove that the defendant company was grossly negligent. .. .")
71. 256 Pa. 86, 100 A. 529 (1917); accord, Herron v. Pittsburgh, 204
Pa. 509, 54 A. 311 (1903) (officers knew that a police call wire, carrying
little current but near highly charged wires, was broken for one hour
and took no action).
72. 23 Pa. Super. 425 (1903).
street car conductor observed a broken wire and returned to the
car barn "without leaving any word or warning of the danger to
those using the public highway. '7 3 Furthermore, agents of the
company did not turn off the current for one hour. In a suit for
the value of a team of horses killed when it came in contact with the
broken wire, the plaintiff prevailed due to defendant's negligence.
The question is frequently presented as to how much time
must pass to visit on the company constructive notice of its
broken line. The following rule was stated in Schrull v. Philadel-
phia Suburban Gas & Electric Co.:
74
Of course, in such cases the company is entitled to a
fair time and opportunity to discover and correct the
trouble which may be suddenly occasioned, but what at-
tention is required necessarily varies with the circum-
stances, and it is for the jury to say whether proper super-
vision had been exercised, having regard to the character
of the wiring, the current which it carried, the density of
the population in the neighborhood, and the probability of
causing an accident due to the closeness of the construction
to the traveled road: [citations omitted] .5
A wire had been broken for four hours before the plaintiff was
injured when he contacted it while walking on a road in Zinkiewicz
v. Citizens' Electric & Illuminating Co. 76 The defendant was held
negligent for not having in its plant the proper device which would
have given it prompt notice of the break, especially since the device
was commonly known and in general use.
In the interesting case of Karam v. Pennsylvania Power &
Light Co.,77 decedent was electrocuted by backing his car over a
live wire lying on the street as a result of a severe storm. Defend-
ant power company had notice of the break for eight minutes be-
fore the accident and did nothing to prevent the occurrence. De-
fendant's repair station was only 1 blocks away, and there were
four employees available who were qualified to handle the wire.
Moreover, the busy street was filled with water, and this was the
only high-tension line of which the defendant had notice. Whether
the delay of eight minutes was reasonable or unreasonable was held
to be jury question.
VI. ELECTRICAL INJURIES TO CHILDREN
The leading Pennsylvania case involving electrical injuries to
73. Id. at 426.
74. 279 Pa. 473, 124 A. 141 (1924).
75. Id. at 476, 124 A. at 142; accord, Grossheim v. Pittsburgh & Alle-
gheny Tel. Co., 255 Pa. 382, 100 A. 126 (1917) (fallen wire remained unre-
paired for 16 hours, contacted a charged line and injured pedestrian).
76. 53 Pa. Super. 572 (1913). Another constructive notice case is
Berstein v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 235 Pa. 53, 83 A. 612 (1912), where
plaintiff was injured while shovelling coal in which was imbedded a
broken wire. The issue of notice was for the jury.
77. 205 Pa. Super. 318, 208 A.2d 876 (1965).
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children is Bartleson v. Glen Alden Coal Co. 78 There, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court adopted section 339 of the Restatement of
Torts79 as the law of Pennsylvania. An 11 year old boy was se-
verely injured after he climbed 15 feet on defendant's high tension
transmission tower. The tower was enclosed by a fence seven feet
high and access was gained through gates which were not properly
locked, but merely fastened shut with a small strand of wire. Chil-
dren frequently played in the area. Defendant was found negli-
gent in failing to exercise ordinary care in safeguarding the tower;
it was held that the gates should have been secured in such a way
that they could not be opened.
A railroad company was not liable for the death of a minor
plaintiff who climbed onto a standing coal car on defendant's
track and touched the electric line which supplied the current to
power the train. 0 It was argued that access was gained through a
defective gate, but the court cited the rule that a railroad has no
obligation to fence its right of way.8
Failure to provide adequate protection for a pole or tower pro-
vided the basis for liability in Hyndman v. Pennsylvania R.R.
8 2
In that case, an 11 year old boy climbed defendant's pole or tower
on a metal ladder and came into contact with an insufficiently in-
sulated transformer wire. The "anti-climb gate" proved inadequate
for its purpose. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court again relied on
section 339 of the Restatment of Torts. In another case, 83 a coal
company maintained a transformer on a lot frequented by chil-
78. 361 Pa. 519, 64 A.2d 846 (1949).
79. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 339 (1934):
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young
children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artifi-
cial condition which he maintains upon the land, if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon
which the possessor knows or should know that such chil-
dren are likely to trespass; and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or
should know and which he realizes or should realize as
involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily
harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the
condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in
it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it. and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition
is slight as compared to the risk to young children in-
volved therein.
The above quoted language has been changed and a new subsection has
been added by RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 339 (1965).
80. Malischewski v. Pennsylvania R.R., 356 Pa. 554, 52 A.2d 215
(1947).
81. Id. at 556, 52 A.2d at 216.
82. 396 Pa. 190, 152 A.2d 251 (1959).
83. Costanza v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 276 Pa. 90, 119 A. 819 (1923).
dren; the wire fence was not effective to prevent access by minor
plaintiff who was injured by contacting live wires. Recovery was
permitted against the coal company because of the inadequacy of
the barrier surrounding the transformer.
Recovery was permitted where a boy of 10 climbed a tree on a
city street and contacted a defectively insulated wire, when de-
fendant knew or should have known that children played around
the tree. 4 In another case8s where a young boy was killed by con-
tact with a broken wire, recovery was permitted upon proof that
the electric company had notice that the wire was making contact
with the branches of the tree.
Where children come into contact with electric lines in highly
extraordinary ways, the company is not responsible for failure to
anticipate the injuries.8 6 Likewise, where the conduct of the
company cannot reasonably be considered the proximate cause of




Even with the rule of the highest degree of care confronting
electric companies, contributory negligence of an injured person
is still a defense in Pennsylvania."8
Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said:
While the supplier of electricity is under the duty of a high
degree of care there is likewise imposed upon those who
are aware of and work in the vicinity of electrical high ten-
sion wires a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid in-
jury to themselves .... 19
84. Mullen v. Wilkes-Barre Gas & Elec. Co., 38 Pa. Super. 3 (1908),
aff'd., 229 Pa. 54, 77 A. 1108 (1910).
85. Morris v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 278 Pa. 361, 123 A. 321 (1924).
86. Green v. West Penn Ry., 246 Pa. 340, 92 A. 341 (1914) (young
boy grabbed copper wire thrown over defendant's uninsulated line by
other boys); O'Gara v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 244 Pa. 156, 90 A. 529 (1914)
(boy 7 years of age contacted uninsulated wire after climbing an awning
and walking onto a horizontal bar); Trout v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 236
Pa. 506, 84 A. 967 (1912) (young boy attempting to detach his kite from an
electric line 4% feet from the cornice of his house, threw a corncob tied to
the end of a string over the wires, drawing it to him and causing injuries);
Rumovicz v. Scranton Elec. Co., 44 Pa. Super. 582 (1910) (11 year old
boy stuck fingers through a pane of glass on defendant's premises and
touched a live wire).
87. Kosson v. West Penn Power Co., 293 Pa. 131, 141 A. 734 (1928)
(a tilting rock on a hillside threw minor into transformer; failure to fence
transformer on the side with the steep hill held not to be the proximate
cause); Roche v. Pennsylvania R.R., 169 Pa. Super. 48, 82 A.2d 332 (1951)
(boy of 8 fell from roof contacting a wire-fall, and not defendant's fail-
ure to bar access to property, was the proximate cause).
88. Kube v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 390 F.2d 506, 510 n.11 (3d Cir.
1968); Weir v. Haverford Elec. Light Co., 221 Pa. 611, 616, 70 A. 874 (1908).
89. Skoda v. West Penn Power, 411 Pa. 323, 328, 191 A.2d 822, 825
(1963).
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Notice should be taken of two principles of law, applicable in
electrical injury cases as elsewhere. First, a court will declare con-
tributory negligence to exist as a matter of law only where the
facts are so clear that there is no room for fair and reasonable men
to differ as to its existence.9 0 Secondly, a deceased person is en-
titled to a presumption of due care, and he will be declared con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of law only when the evidence is
so clear, direct and positive as to preclude any difference in the
minds of fair and reasonable men.9 1
The extent of the knowledge of an injured person is important
on the issue of his contributory negligence. The general public is
presumed to know that there is danger present in electric wires,
but is "not bound to know its degree in any particular case. '92 The
public is not chargeable with as high a degree of knowledge of the
danger as the company which maintains the line.93
The mere presence of poles and wires on the land does not
charge a business visitor with knowledge of danger. As was
was pointed out in Stimmel v. Kerr,94 the presence of poles may
indicate "overhead insulated or uninsulated electric wires" or rela-
tively harmless "telephone wires, television lines, and 'canned'
music lines."0 5 Massive steel towers would, however, indicate the
danger of high voltage transmission lines.96
B. Contributory Negligence as a Matter of Law
Where the injured person knows of the danger of electricity,
or should know of it because of warnings, and still acts in disregard
of his own safety, he may be contributorily negligent as a matter
of law. Thus, in Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel
Co.,9 a decedent was contributorily negligent when he directed the
90. Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 333, 191 A.2d 822,
827-28 (1963); Cooper v. Heintz Mfg. Co., 385 Pa. 296, 306, 122 A.2d 699,
704 (1956).
91. Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 332, 191 A.2d 822,
827 (1963).
92. Fitzgerald v. Edison Elec. Co., 200 Pa. 540, 543, 50 A. 161, 161
(1901). The court begins with the statement: "Wires charged with an elec-
tric current may be harmless, or they may be in the highest degree danger-
ous." Id. Since the difference is not apparent to ordinary observation, the
court reasons that the public is not bound to know the degree of danger.
93. Brillhart v. Edison Light & Power Co., 368 Pa. 307, 313-14, 82 A.2d
44, 48 (1951); Kaufman v. Pittsburgh Ry., 363 Pa. 96, 100-01, 69 A.2d 90,
92-93 (1949).
94. 394 Pa. 609, 148 A.2d 232 (1959).
95. Id. at 612, 148 A.2d at 233.
96. Id.
97. 353 Pa. 150, 155, 44 A.2d 594, 597 (1945). See also Moore v.
United States, 217 F. Supp. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1963), aff'd, 332 F.2d 372 (3d Cir.
boom of a crane dangerously close to a high tension line although
he knew of the danger and possibility of arcing; and then he placed
his hands on an iron bucket, through which coursed electricity
causing his death. Similarly, in Pfahler v. Pennsylvania Power &
Light Co., 98 a painter died of injuries caused when he moved paint-
ing equipment against a transformer after he was warned of the
danger both by his foreman and by warning signs attached to the
transformer. Also, where an engineering student should have rea-
lized the potential danger in- climbing upon a circuit breaker, es-
pecially after repeated warnings to him, he was found contribu-
torily negligent in Hamilton v. United States.9 9
There are many other cases where contributory negligence has
been declared as a matter of law when the injured person plainly
disregarded his own safety.
A line inspector failed to use rubber gloves provided for his
safety.10 0 A painter disregarded warnings and came in contact
with wires at a point ordinarily out of reach. 10 1 Decedent, who
was electrocuted, deliberately placed himself within six inches of
wires he was warned not to go near until the current was turned
off. 10 2 A workman deliberately placed equipment in such a way
that a cable came into close proximity to an electric line 20 to 30
feet above the ground, despite signs warning him of the overhead
wires. 10 3 Decedent, without reason, approached a sagging wire,
then slipped or fell, making contact with it.104 Decedent threw
an aerial wire over a power line. 0 5 A workman was injured
while hoisting equipment through a third story window near high
tension lines after he was warned of the danger. 0 6 Although
warned of the danger, a decedent contacted wire while working on
a bridge girder. 0 7 A farmer was killed when he removed a guy
line from defendant's transmission line and dragged it 140 feet,
contacting a distribution line.
s08
There are also cases declaring contributory negligence as a
1964); Kronk v. West Penn Power Co., 422 Pa. 458, 222 A.2d 720 (1966);
Repyneck v. Tarantino, 415 Pa. 92, 202 A.2d 105 (1964).
98. 351 Pa. 287, 40 A.2d 692 (1945). The court quoted from Haertel v.
Pennsylvania Light & Power Co., 219 Pa. 640, 69 A. 282 (1908): "[When]
one heedlessly brings himself in contact with such a wire, and is injured in
consequence, his imprudence must be regarded as a contributing cause, and
will prevent recovery." Id. at 643, 69 A. at 282.
99. 143 F. Supp. 179, 184 (W.D. Pa. 1956).
100. Hart v. Allegheny County Light Co., 201 Pa. 234, 50 A. 1010 (1902).
101. Weir v. Haverford Elec. Co., 221 Pa. 611, 70 A. 874 (1908).
102. Williams v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 267 Pa. 158, 110 A. 92 (1920).
103. Aljoe v. Penn Cent. Light & Power Co., 281 Pa. 368, 126 A. 759
(1924).
104. Chernuka v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 320 Pa. 193, 182 A. 543 (1936).
105. Parker v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 301 Pa. 375, 152 A. 538 (1930).
106. Eberlin v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 306 Pa. 239, 159 A. 439 (1932).
107. Matlack v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 312 Pa. 206, 167 A. 37
(1933).
108. Rank v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 370 Pa. 107, 87 A.2d 198 (1952).
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matter of law where persons, apparently for no proper reasons,
grabbed bare electric lines. Thus, in Thompson v. Pennsylvania
Power Co.,'0 recovery was denied because of decedent's con-
tributory negligence where he was walking through a wooded
area and saw blackened electric lines sagging eight to ten feet above
the ground. He leaped up playfully and grabbed both lines, one
in each hand, and was electrocuted. Plaintiff's decedent in Durinzi
v. West Penn Power Co.,1 0 was painting the roof of a carpenter
shop. He stood upright and apparently grabbed a high tension
line six feet above the roof after he was cautioned of the danger and
indicated that he would be careful. Similarly, in Lindsay v. Glen
Alden Coal Co.,'1" an experienced lineman ran up a high embank-
ment and touched defendant's wires. Recovery was denied. In
Hoke v. Edison Light & Power Co.,112 a workman grabbed charged
lines to avoid a fall from a ladder too short for the work being
done. Again, recovery was denied.
C. Contributory Negligence-A Jury Question
Generally, if a person does not know of the danger involved,
or if his attention is diverted by being engrossed in his work, or if
he does not act in such a way as to be the obvious author of his harm,
his contributory negligence is a factual issue to be determined by
the jury.
In the leading case of Skoda v. West Penn Power Co.,113 the
issue of decedent's contributory negligence was for the jury. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court said:
There is evidence in the record that decedent was aware
of the high tension lines and their danger and the necessity
to avoid contact with them. The area in which decedent
was engaged in his work was in the vicinity of and at times
under the lines. It is quite normal and likely that, at
times, the decedent, as other men working in the area, could
conceivably become so engrossed in his work, particularly
on trucks of the size and and type here involved, as to
make him temporarily oblivious to any other surrounding
danger .... 114
In Ashby v. Philadelphia Electric Co.,115 a structural steel
109. 402 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1968); accord, Wood v. Diamond Elec. Co.,
185 Pa. 529, 39 A. 1111 (1898) (deliberately touched an electrified screen
to show it was not charged).
110. 357 Pa. 576, 55 A.2d 316 (1947).
111. 318 Pa. 133, 177 A. 751 (1935).
112. 284 Pa. 112, 130 A. 309 (1925).
113. 411 Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963).
114. Id. at 332, 191 A.2d at 827.
115. 328 Pa. 474, 195 A. 887 (1938).
worker was guiding a 1,000 pound girder into place, when the crane
from which it was suspended came near a high tension line, causing
arcing and killing decedent. His contributory negligence under
the facts was held to be a jury question even though he apparently
knew of the existence of the line. In Stimmel v. Kerr,116 where the
poles and wires were plainly visible, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court refused to declare workmen contributorily negligent because
it was not certain that they were aware of the degree of danger in-
volved. The painter in Fitzgerald v. Edison Electric Co.11 not
only knew of the wires but propped them out of his way for his
convenience, and still the issue of his negligence was for the jury.
Many factual stiuations give rise to jury issues on the question
of contributory negligence, some of which follow. A tinner came
in contact with an improperly insulated fuse box on a roof.118 A
painter contacted wires which appeared to be insulated. 119 A pe-
destrian stepped on an iron plate in a sidewalk which was charged
by contact with a broken wire. 20 A roofer fell to his death from
atop a ladder after touching defendant's uninsulated wires, where
there was evidence that the sun was in his eyes, even where it was
alleged that he used a ladder too short for his purposes.' 21 De-
cedent, under stress because his mother's house was on fire,
stepped on a wire broken from the heat of the fire.122 A young
boy stepped on broken wire concealed by leaves of a tree which
fell on a path.128 A pedestrian was walking with his head
down when he contacted a sagging wire five or six feet above the
street. 24 A police officer, in the discharge of his duty, tried to re-
move a broken wire with his mace."82 A pedestrian contacted a
broken wire while walking on the street. 126 Decedent was handling
a pipe which contacted high voltage lines. No evidence was pre-
sented that he saw or should have seen the lines or knew of the
danger. 2 7 A negligently operated truck knocked down a utility
pole carrying high tension lines, which fell on a cable fence, elec-
trifying it. Plaintiff's decedent, a passenger, endeavoring to go
through the cable fence 150 feet from the wreckage, was electro-
116. 394 Pa. 609, 148 A.2d 232 (1959).
117. 200 Pa. 540, 50 A. 161 (1901).
118. MacDougall v. Pennsylvania Light & Power Co., 311 Pa. 387, 166
A. 589 (1933).
119. Yeager v. Edison Elec. Co., 242 Pa. 101, 88 A. 872 (1913).
120. Smith v. Harwood Elec. Co., 255 Pa. 165, 99 A. 473 (1916).
121. Shapiro v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 342 Pa. 416, 21 A.2d 26 (1941).
122. Sebok v. Pennsylvania Edison Co., 331 Pa. 524, 1 A.2d 680 (1938).
123. Markovich v. Jefferson Corp., 146 Pa. Super. 108, 22 A.2d 65
(1941).
124. Mayhugh v. Somerset Tel. Co., 265 Pa. 498, 109 A. 211 (1920).
125. Dillon v. Allegheny County Light Co., 179 Pa. 482, 36 A. 164
(1897).
126. Laritza v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 106 Pa. Super. 587, 162 A. 333
(1932).
127. Brillhart v. Edison Light & Power Co., 368 Pa. 307, 82 A.2d 44
(1951).
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cuted. 128 An experienced structural iron worker made a decision
to go up to the roof of a transformer room in the performance of
his dutes, and lowered himself near copper tubing from which arc-
ing electricity injured him.129 An aviator struck a wire 185 feet
above the Susquehanna River. °30 A business visitor, injured by
electricity arcing onto a nearby boom, had the right to assume that
he would not be led into a position of danger without warning.13
An electrician was shocked when he brushed against a wire from
which the insulation broke.'3 2 Decedent backed his car over a
broken and fallen wire in a water filled street.133
VIII. INTERVENING ACT-SUPEREDING CAUSE
Electrical injuries frequently occur as a result of an intervening
force which becomes active in producing the injury after the origi-
nal negligence of the defendant. The question arises as to whether
the intervening act becomes a superseding cause, relieving the origi-
nal wrongdoer of responsibility.
Skoda v. West Penn Power Co.'3 4 provides a typical factual sit-
uation. Defendant's original negligence consisted of constructing
its high tension lines too low. Plaintiff's decedent was a fellow em-
ployee of a truck driver who negligently drove a large dump truck,
with bed extended, into the wires, causing fatal injuries to decedent.
The court, relying upon the Restatement of Torts, 3 5 refused to de-
cide as a matter of law that the negligent act of the truck driver
was a superseding cause relieving the electric company:
The fact that an intervening act of a third person is
negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does
not make it a superseding cause of harm to another which
the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bring-
ing about, if (a) the actor at the time of his negligent con-
duct should have realized that a third person might so act
"188
128. Thornton v. Weaber, 380 Pa. 590, 112 A.2d 344 (1955).
129. Cooper v. Heintz Mfg. Co., 385 Pa. 296, 122 A.2d 699 (1956).
130. Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Light & Power Co., 385 Pa. 520, 123 A.2d
636 (1956).
131. Stark v. Lehigh Foundries, Inc., 388 Pa. 1, 130 A.2d 123 (1957).
132. Meehan v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 424 Pa. 51, 225 A.2d 900
(1967).
133. Karam v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 205 Pa. Super. 318, 208
A.2d 876 (1965).
134. 411 Pa. 323, 330-32, 191 A.2d 822, 826-28 (1963).
135. RESTATEMENT or TORTS § 447 (1934) (now RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965)) (quoted note 136 infra).
136. Id. at 330, 191 A.2d at 826 (quoting RESTATEMIENT OF TORTS § 447
(1934) ).
The Skoda case also quoted from Roadman v. Bellone,13 7 further
explaining the principles of superseding cause:
However, some intervening negligent acts which op-
erate upon a condition created by an antecedent tortfeasor
do constitute superseding causes and relieve him of liability.
In determining whether an intervening force is a supersed-
ing cause we said in Hendricks v. Pyramid Motor Freight
Corp., 328 Pa. 570, 574, 195 A. 907, 909: "The answer to this
inquiry depends on whether the [intervening] conduct was
so extraordinary as not to have been reasonably foreseeable
or whether it was reasonably to be anticipated." The Re-
statement, Torts § 435 (2), (1948 Supp. p. 736) says: "The
actor's conduct is not a legal cause of harm to another where
after the event and looking back from the harm to the
actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly ex-
traordinary that it should have brought about the
harm.". ..138
In a case where the electric company argued that it was re-
lieved of negligence by the operation of a crane in close proximity
to electric lines, the court held that the "question of what is the
proximate cause of an accident is almost always one of fact for the
jury."'13 9 It has also been held, however, that where there is no
dispute as to pertinent facts, the question of superseding cause
may be determined by the court as a matter of law.
1 40
The issue of superseding cause arises typically in cases where
tall machines bring about the injury by striking overhead lines.
A large dump truck was involved in the Skoda 41 case, and a
tall crane was involved in Ashby v. Philadelphia Electric Co.
1 42
Both cases held that it was for the jury to decide whether or not
the contact by the tall equipment was a superseding cause reliev-
ing the original wrongdoer. Bowser v. Publicker Industries, Inc.
1 43
was a federal case applying Pennsylvania law. The court relied on
the Restatement rules 1 44 and held that the operation of a crane in
proximity of high tension lines was not a superseding cause reliev-
ing a subcontractor of liability for failing to have safety equipment
on the crane. Couched in Restatement language, the court said:
Certainly, no one knowing the way in which a crane op-
erates and the comparatively narrow space in which the
137. 379 Pa. 483, 493, 108 A.2d 754, 759 (1954).
138. 411 Pa. at 331, 191 A.2d at 826-27 (quoting Roadman v. Bellone,
379 Pa. 483, 493, 103 A.2d 754, 759 (1954) ) (editorial addition by the court
in Roadman).
139. Ashby v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 328 Pa. 474, 479, 195 A. 887, 889
(1938). See also Nelson v. Duquesne Light Co., 338 Pa. 37, 54-55, 12 A.2d
299, 307-08 (1940).
140. Roadman v. Bellone, 379 Pa. 483, 493, 108 A.2d 754, 759 (1954).
141. 411 Pa. 323, 191 A.2d 822 (1963).
142. 328 Pa. 474, 195 A. 887 (1938).
143. 101 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. Pa. 1951), alf'd., 192 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.
1951).
144. RESTATEMENT Or TORTS § 447 (1934) (now RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) or TORTS § 447 (1965)).
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crane operator had to work would regard it as highly ex-
traordinary that he should swing the boom so that the
cable would come too close to the power line.
145
In Stark v. Lehigh Foundaries, Inc.,14 defendant negligently per-
mitted work to be done under high voltage lines. It was held to be
a jury issue whether or not the action of the crane operator in
bringing the boom too close to the lines was a superseding cause,
relieving defendant from its original negligence.
Nelson v. Duquesne Light Co.147 presented an interesting prob-
lem involving an intervening act. In that death case, the City of
Pittsburgh was the original wrongdoer in permitting an electrical
utility to place its pole in such a position as to be an obstacle to
traffic. The intervening act was the negligent operation of an
automobile in which decedent was a passenger; it crashed into the
pole and caused the fatal injuries. The court relied to a great ex-
tent on the Restatement principles1 48 in holding that the question
of superseding cause was for the jury.
On the other hand, Roadman v. Bellone' 49 held as a matter of
law that the reckless operation of a police car constituted a super-
seding cause absolving the electric company from responsibility.
There, the negligently operated police car struck plaintiff's auto-
mobile, forcing it against the electric company's pole, moving it one
inch at its base, and throwing plaintiff from his automobile. The
transformers on the pole were dislodged and fell on plaintiff, caus-
ing him additional injuries. It was held that the manner in which
the power company maintained its transformers on its pole was not
the legal cause of the injuries because the accident occurred in a
highly extraordinary way.
An interesting early case dealing with the problem of inter-
vening cause is Eagle Hose Co. v. Electric Light Co.So The fire
company sued the electric company for the death of its horse. De-
fendant maintained an arc lamp on a pole 40 feet from where a fire
broke out to which plaintiff was driving its engine. The lamp was
suspended on an arm attached to a rope. The fire burned through
the rope, causing the lamp to fall to the street. Plaintiff's horse
stepped on a live wire and was killed. The court held that the fire
did not break the chain of causation between the negligence of
145. 101 F. Supp. at 387-88.
146. 388 Pa. 1, 11, 130 A.2d 123, 130 (1957).
147. 338 Pa. 37, 53-57, 12 A.2d 299, 307-08 (1940).
148. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 447 (1934) (now RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 447 (1965) ).
149. 379 Pa. 483, 493, 108 A.2d 754, 759 (1954).
150. 33 Pa. Super. 581 (1907).
not properly safeguarding the arc lamp and the ultimate harm
caused by that negligence.
IX. EVIDENCE
A. Use of Codes and Regulations
The use of codes and regulations are frequently overlooked in
the trial of electrical injury cases. They are effective in establish-
ing standards of care, and in some instances, the violation of man-
datory regulations promulgated by statutory authority may prove
negligence per se.
The Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission has adopted
Electric Regulations applicable to the regulation of electric utili-
ties.' ' There are also several national electric codes which can
be useful in establishing a standard of care.15 2
Several Pennsylvania cases have spoken of the use of codes.
In Meehan v. Philadelphia Electric Co.,' 53 it was held error to ex-
clude provisions of the National Electric Code offered to establish a
proper standard of care. However, caution must be taken to prove
the codes properly. In Brillhart v. Edison Light & Power Co., 1 5 4
standards promulgated by the Electrical Code of the Federal
Bureau of Standards could not be proved on the oral testimony of
an expert. The court commented that the "best evidence" rule
required the introduction of the actual bureau records. In Skoda
v. West Penn Power Co.,1 55 it was held that the minimum clearance
of wires prescribed by the Federal Mine's Safety Code was not ap-
plicable to the electrical industry. It was further held in Skoda
that where the wires were strung at a height below defendant com-
151. Pa. P.U.C., Electric Regulations (June 30, 1969). The latest Regu-
lations are amended to June 24, 1968, and a copy may be obtained from
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, Bureau of Investigations, Service
and Enforcement, P.O. Box 3265, Harrisburg, Pa. 17120.
152. United States Standards Institute, 10 East 40th Street, New
York, New York 10016, adopts standards of various industries and acts as
a national clearinghouse. It published a catalog of standards. Other
standards are published by Edison Electric Institute, 750 Third Avenue,
New York, New York 10017. The National Electrical Code is published by
National Fire Protection Association, 60 Batterymarch Street, Boston,
Massachusetts 02110. It should be noted that the Electric Safety Regula-
tions of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry were pre-
pared in cooperation with the National Bureau of Standards.
153. 424 Pa. 51, 58-59, 225 A.2d 900, 905 (1967); see Janowicz v. Cruci-
ble Steel, 433 Pa. 304, 308, 249 A.2d 773, 775 (1969). In MacDougall v.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 311 Pa. 387, 395, 166 A. 589, 592 (1933),
the National Electrical Code taken from the National Electric Light Associ-
ation Safety Code was held not appropriate to prove common usage.
154. 368 Pa. 307, 314, 82 A.2d 44, 48 (1951). It has been held that courts
are permitted to take judicial notice of regulations enacted pursuant to
legislative authority. Edelbrew Brewing Co. v. Weiss, 170 Pa. Super. 34, 37,
84 A.2d 371, 372 (1951) (regulations of Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board); Ridley v. Boyer, 87 Dauph. 81, 100-02 (Pa. C.P. 1967), af'd., 426
Pa. 28, 231 A.2d 307 (1967) (I.C.C. Regulations).
155. 411 Pa. 323, 330, 191 A.2d 822, 826 (1963).
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pany's own minimum specifications, that fact was evidence of neg-
ligence. Finally, the dissenting opinion in Thompson v. Pennsyl-
vania Power Co.156 indicated that evidence was presented that
continued maintenance of wires in their condition at the time of
the accident violated the National Electrical Safety Code published
by the Bureau of Standards.
A very important source of evidence in the establishment of a
standard of care or proof of negligence is found in the various reg-
ulations promulgated by the Pennsylvania Department of Labor
and Industry.157 Some of the useful regulations for electrical in-
jury cases are titled Demolition Work,158 Cranes, Booms and
Hoists,159 and Electric Safety. 16 0 The regulations are issued by the
Department pursuant to statutory authority.""
The first Pennsylvania case considering the admissibility of
rules and regulations of the Department of Labor and Industry
on the question of negligence was Weimer v. Westmoreland Water
Co.162 The rules and regulations were held to be admissible, with
an indication that they may afford evidence of negligence. In
Dougherty v. A.M. Uhrik, Inc., 63 the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania hinted that a violation of the
regulations might have been negligence per se, but the court ap-
proved of a charge indicating that a violation is evidence of negli-
gence.
In Stark v. Lehigh Foundries, Inc.,16 4 a supplier of cranes was
held responsible where he did not equip his crane with proper pro-
tective devices
... in accordance with accepted general safety practice
in the business and as mandatorily required under the
'Rules for Cranes and Hoists' promulgated by the Depart-
156. 402 F.2d 88, 93 (3d Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
157. A complete list of Safety Regulations, most of which are supplied
without cost, may be obtained from Department of Labor and Industry,
Bureau of Inspection, 1517 State Office Building, 300 Liberty Avenue, Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania 15222. The Industrial Board of the Department is
located at 7th and Forster Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
158. Pa. D.L.I., Regulations for Demolition Work (1968 ed.).
159. Pa. D.L.I., Regulations for Cranes, Booms and Hoists (1968 ed.).
160. Pa. D.L.I., Electric Safety Regulations (1965 ed.).
161. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 25-12 (1964):
The Department of Labor and Industry shall have the power and
its duty shall be to make, alter, amend, and repeal rules and regu-
lations for carrying into effect all of the provisions of this act, and
applying such provisions to specific conditions.
162. 127 Pa. Super. 201, 207-08, 193 A. 665, 667-68 (1937).
163. 128 F. Supp. 918, 919 (E.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd., 227 F.2d 519 (3d Cir.
1955); accord, Green v. Sanitary Scale Co., 296 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
164. 388 Pa. 1, 130 A.2d 123 (1957).
ment of Labor and Industry of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania pursuant to statute.0 5
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Walsh v. Miehle-Goss-
Dexter, Inc.,16  held that the denial of a request to charge in the
language of a safety regulation of the Department of Labor and In-
dustry was error, especially when the charge on negligence was
inadequate. The dissent in the Walsh case stated that the violation
of the regulation was negligence per se under Pennsylvania law,
since it is a mandatory regulation.
16 7
B. Use of Experts in Electrical Injury Cases
Experts are frequently used in electrical injury cases, and the
usual rule of evidence is applied that an expert may assist the jury
in arriving at proper conclusions on questions involving scientific
or other special knowledge.
A witness need not be a registered electrical engineer to qualify
as an expert in a case involving electricity, and the fact that he is
not goes only to the weight of his testimony, and not to its admissi-
bility.168 However, in a case where a witness is obviously not quali-
fied to testify as to the proper construction of high tension lines,
his testimony will be excluded. 1 9 Similarly, a witness does not
qualify as an expert on the subject of lightning when he has little
or no scientific training or knowledge, and what he knows about
electricity, he learned from experience as a workman.
170
Experts have testified in Pennsylvania cases on a myriad of
subjects, some of which follow. The breaking of wires was caused
by improper splicing; moreover, the distance between the poles sup-
porting them was too great, causing them to fall of their own
weight.1 17 The break in a trolley wire was caused by poor initial
construction, the deteriorated condition of the wire, lack of proper
maintenance, and burning caused where trolley wheels did not
make proper contact. 172 In a broken wire case, if defendant com-
pany would have been equipped with necessary devices, commonly
known and in general use, it would have had immediate notice of a
break in its lines and it could have disconnected its current to avoid
the injury.' It is not possible for a person to be injured by
165. Id. at 7, 130 A.2d at 128.
166. 378 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1967).
167. Id. at 415-16 (dissenting opinion).
168. Bowser v. Publicker Industries, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 386, 388 (E.D. Pa.
1951),aff'd., 192 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1951).
169. Durinzi v. West Penn Power Co., 357 Pa. 576, 580, 55 A.2d 316, 318
(1947).
170. Sinkovich v. Bell Tel. Co., 286 Pa. 427, 133 A. 629 (1926).
171. Laudenslager v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 312 Pa. 169,
172, 167 A. 778, 779 (1933).
172. Fitzsimmons v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 56 Pa. Super. 365
(1914).
173. Zinkiewicz v. Citizens' Elec. & Illuminating Co., 53 Pa. Super.
572, 580 (1913); accord, Sebok v. Pennsylvania Edison Co., 331 Pa. 524, 527,
1 A.2d 680, 681-82 (1938).
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electricity while seated in an automobile. 174 It is improper to
string wires close enough to a frame house so that if that house
catches fire, the wire melts from the heat and is broken. 175 If de-
fendant's electrical system would have been properly grounded,
lightning which struck its wires would not have been carried to
plaintiff's barn.176 A long span of a transmission line was unusual
and not "ordinary good practice," causing a heavy sag of approxi-
mately five feet. 77 The defective condition of insulation was
not of recent origin, but was due to wear and tear and exposure to
elements for approximately 25 years.178 In the same case, one ex-
pert stated that a fire was caused by a defective vending machine;
the opposing expert said that the vending machine was damaged
by an external fire. 79 Insulation covering was inadequate for a
120 to 240 voltage wire; it should have had a 600 volts rating.180
If insulation were in good condition, plaintiff would have felt no
shock. 18 1 The effective life of a particular type of insulation runs
from 7 to 12 years.'8 2 High voltage lines on poles 8 to 10 feet high,
running along a commonly used path, should have been insu-
lated.1 3 One may receive electric shock with no burns, and the
natural reaction to even a slight shock is involuntary withdrawal.
84
"Wires should have a clearance of eighteen feet above building and
twenty feet above public roads.'
85
C. Custom and Usage in Establishing Standard of Care
Usage in the industry may be considered as a factor in deter-
mining the standard of care. For example, where the minimum
height of wires above the ground is in issue, it has been held that
"the common usage in the business is a fair test or standard of
174. Hess v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 146-47, 56 A.2d 89,
90 (1948).
175. Sebok v. Pennsylvania Edison Co., 331 Pa. 524, 528, 1 A.2d 680, 682
(1938).
176. Jones v. Monroe Elec. Co., 350 Pa. 539, 541, 39 A.2d 569, 571 (1944).
177. Kaufman v. Pittsburgh Ry., 363 Pa. 96, 99, 69 A.2d 90, 92 (1949).
178. Id. at 99-100, 69 A.2d at 92.
179. Marrazzo v. Scranton Nehi Bottling Co., 422 Pa. 518, 223 A.2d 17
(1966).




183. Markovich v. Jefferson Corp., 146 Pa. Super. 108, 113, 22 A.2d 65,
67 (1941).
184. Shaprio v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 342 Pa. 416, 419, 21 A.2d 26, 28
(1941).
185. Brillhart v. Edison Light & Power Co., 368 Pa. 307, 311-12, 82 A.2d
44, 47 (1951).
care."'ns Where sagging wires are involved, evidence is proper that
the span of a transmission line was unusual and not "ordinary good
practice."'1 7 Also, an electric company will be held responsible for
not employing necessary safety devices which are commonly known
and in general use.188 However, a telephone company was absolved
of liability for injury to a user caused by atmospheric electricity
where the company proved that the best known safety device in
general use was placed on the telephone in question.8 9
Testimony of the practice prevailing in a particular business
is admissible when offered by the defendant to disprove negligence,
as well as when it is offered by plaintiff to establish negligence.1 90
As to the quality of the proof needed to establish the practice
in an industry, it has been said that the evidence should prove that
the custom was "certain, reasonable, distinct, uncontradicted, con-
tinued and so notorious as to be probably known to all parties con-
trolled by it."' 91
It is essential to note that where the custom is proved by oral
testimony, it is for the jury to decide what the custom is. In Fox
v. Keystone Telephone Co.,192 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
said: "Where, as in the present case, proof of usage or custom de-
pends on oral testimony, the weight and credibility of such evidence
is exclusively for the jury."'193 This rule applies even where the de-
fendant has presented strong oral testimony that its conduct was in
accord with the prevailing practice,'9 4 or has denied that the custom
existed as established by plaintiff.195
While usage or custom in a particular business is an important
factor to consider on the issue of negligence, it is not conclusive,
and what constitutes reasonable diligence depends on the facts in
the specific case.' 96
Where the conduct in question is inherently dangerous, proof
186. Skoda v. West Penn Power Co., 411 Pa. 323, 329, 191 A.2d 822, 826
(1963); Brillhart v. Edison Light & Power Co., 368 Pa. 307, 313, 82 A.2d
44, 47 (1951).
187. Kaufman v. Pittsburgh Ry., 363 Pa. 96, 99, 69 A.2d 90, 92 (1949).
188. Zinkiewicz v. Citizens' Elec. & Illuminating Co., 53 Pa. Super. 572,
580 (1913); accord, Eagle Hose Co. v. Electric Light Co., 33 Pa. Super. 581,
587 (1907).
189. Rocap v. Bell Tel. Co., 230 Pa. 597, 79 A. 769 (1911): "... the test
of negligence in methods, machinery and appliance is the ordinary usage
of the business." Id. at 604, 79 A. at 711.
190. Jemison v. Pfeifer, 397 Pa. 81, 86, 152 A.2d 697, 700 (1959).
191. Id. at 89, 152 A.2d at 701.
192. 326 Pa. 420, 192 A. 116 (1937).
193. Id. at 427, 192 A. at 119; accord, Price v. New Castle Refractories
Co., 332 Pa. 507, 512, 3 A.2d 418, 421 (1939).194. Sorensen v. Quaker City Poster Advertising Co., 284 Pa. 209, 130
A. 432 (1925): ". . . However indisputable the proof as to usage or custom
may have been, depending as it did on oral testimony, the jury was the sole
body to determine that fact: [citations omitted]." Id. at 211, 130 A. at 432.
195. Jemison v. Pfeifer, 397 Pa. 81, 89, 152 A.2d 697, 701 (1959).
196. Potere v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 587, 112 A.2d 100, 103 (1955).
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of custom will be of no avail to the defendant. MacDougall v.
Pennsylvania Light & Power Co.197 is a leading case on this subject.
There, severe injuries were caused by contact with a harmless
looking fuse box which actually carried electrical current. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the company's argument
that there was no evidence presented that its conduct was not in
accordance with the ordinary usage in the business. It held:
Usage becomes important only when the conduct in ques-
tion is not inherently dangerous. Viligance must always be
commensurate with danger. A high degree of danger al-
ways calls for a high degree of care. The care to be exer-
cised in a particular case must always be proportionate to
the seriousness of the consequences which are reasonably
to be anticipated as a result of the conduct in question.
Reason does not have to wait on usage; the latter must wait
on reason. 198
The court quoted with approval an earlier Wisconsin case:
[I]f the act in question is obviously dangerous, then evi-
dence of custom is inadmissible, because custom cannot
change the quality of an act .... Hence, when its quality
clearly appears from the act itself, there is no need to in-
voke the aid of custom to determine it.
199
The court finally concluded:
A prudent, sensible person does not have to depend on
usage to tell him that high voltage electrice wires . . .are
dangerous ... and in deciding what these precautions
shall be a person while he may take counsel of custom
should also take counsel of his common sense and of his
judgment. In the long run usage must conform to rea-
son.
200
The rule of the MacDougall case relative to custom and in-
herently dangerous conduct was applied in Hudson v. Grace, 20 1
where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said:
In the piquant language of Mr. Justice Holmes: "What
usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done,
but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reason-
able prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not."
Texas & P. R. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470.... Or,
as was said in Indermaur v. Dames, (1866) L. R. 1 C.P. 274,
288, 19 Eng.Rul.Cas. 64, 78: "No usage could establish that
what was in fact unnecessarily dangerous was in law rea-
197. 311 Pa. 387, 166 A. 589 (1933).
198. Id. at 396, 166 A. at 592.
199. Id. at 397, 166 A. at 593 (quoting Zartner v. George, 156 Wis.
131, 145 N.W. 971-72 (1914) ).
200. Id. at 397, 166 A. at 593.
201. 348 Pa. 175, 34 A.2d 498 (1943).
sonably safe, as against persons towards whom there was a
duty to be careful." [citations omitted] .202
D. Proof of Other Accidents
Evidence that other accidents happened at or near the place
where the injury in question occurred is admissible if it tends to
prove that the defendant had notice of the danger involved.
In Lynch v. Meyersdale Electric Light, Heat & Power Co., 203
evidence was admitted that other persons were shocked shortly
before the accident while using ordinary electric lights in houses
in the neighborhood. Some of the houses were served by the same
transformer involved in the case; others were served by another
transformer.
Nelson v. Duquesne Light Co. 20 4 involved a municipality's neg-
ligence in placing a pole in the pavement in such a way as to be an
obstacle to traffic. Evidence of prior accidents involving the same
pole was admitted with this explanation: "The fact that others
crashed into the pole before Messinger did, put the city on addi-
tional notice that the pole was a menace to traffic. ' 20 5
Fisher v. Pomeroy's, Inc. 20 is a leading Pennsylvania case on
the admissibility of prior accidents to prove notice of a dangerous
condition. The Fisher case was relied on by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Sebok v. Pennsylvania Edison Co.,20 7 where heat
from a burning frame house annealed a wire strung over the house,
causing it to fall to the ground. The court permitted testimony of
a fire in the neighborhood a number of years before in which one
of defendant's wires was burned through and fell to the ground.
The trial court carefully restricted the testimony to prove notice
to defendant of the danger of stringing wires too close to frame
buildings.
In Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 2 ° 8 an aviator
collided with defendant's high tension line 185 feet above a river
and was killed. Evidence was admitted of a similar collision about
202. Id. at 181-82, 34 A.2d at 502; accord, Hemrock v. Peoples Natural
Gas Co., 423 Pa. 259, 270, 223 A.2d 687, 692 (1966), where the court quoted
Donnelly v. Fred Whittaker Co., 364 Pa. 387, 72 A.2d 61 (1950): "Negli-
gence can never be justified by repetition." Id. at 391, 72 A.2d at 63. In
Mazie v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 55-57, 41 A.2d 850, 852-53
(1945), death was caused by inhalation of a volatile solvent. On the issue
of whether adequate warning was given on the label, the fact that similar
labels were used by other manufacturers was not conclusive, and dece-
dent's contributory negligence was for the jury.
203. 268 Pa. 337, 112 A. 58 (1920).
204. 338 Pa. 37, 12 A.2d 299 (1940).
205. Id. at 54, 12 A.2d at 307.
206. 322 Pa. 389, 185 A. 296 (1936).
207. 331 Pa. 524, 528, 1 A.2d 680, 682 (1938) (also citing Muller v.
Kirschbaum Co., 298 Pa. 560, 148 A. 851 (1930), for the proposition that
evidence of prior accidents is admissible as proof of notice of dangerous
condition).
208. 385 Pa. 520, 123 A.2d 636 (1956).
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three years before the one in question.2 09 Furthermore, the court
held that it was error to exclude evidence of another accident
shortly after the one being litigated.
210
E. The Admissibility of Subsequent Repairs or Precautions
The law is clear that evidence of defendant's repairs or pre-
cautions subsequent to an accident cannot be admitted to prove
antecedent negligence.
2 11
However, by force of the rule that evidence is admissible if it
is competent for any purpose, proof of subsequent precautions and
repairs has been held proper for a variety of reasons in electrical
injury cases. A young boy was injured while climbing a tower
holding defedant's transformer in Hyndman v. Pennsylvania R.R.
212
After the accident, defendant attached a sign to its tower reading:
"Danger, Live Wire, Keep Off." Proof that the sign was placed
there after the accident was held admissible, not to show negli-
gence, but merely to demonstrate one of the precautions defendant
could have taken which involved little cost.
After the accident occurred in Cooper v. Heintz Manufacturing
Co.,2 13 defendant placed a guard over the transformer tower. This
evidence was admitted, not to prove responsibility for the accident,
but to prove that defendant controlled the dangerous instrumen-
tality.
In Brillhart v. Edison Light & Power Co., 214 photographs were
admitted which were taken some time after the accident and which
showed changes made by defendant in the location of the wires.
It was held that testimony of the subsequent changes was proper,
not to prove negligence, but to explain, for purposes of accuracy,
the photographs in evidence.
209. Authorities are almost unanimous in holding that evidence of
the occurrence of similar accidents is admissible for the purpose
of establishing the character of the place where they occurred,
their cause, and the imputation of notice, constructive at least, to
the proprietors of the establishment, of the defect and the likeli-
hood of injury.
Id. at 542, 123 A.2d at 648 (quoting from Ringelheim v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
330 Pa. 69, 71, 198 A. 628, 629 (1938) ).
210. 385 Pa. at 542-43, 123 A.2d at 649.
211. Baran v. Reading Iron Co., 202 Pa. 274, 51 A. 979 (1902).
212. 396 Pa. 190, 200-01, 152 A.2d 251, 256-57 (1959).
213. 385 Pa. 296, 303-04, 122 A.2d 699, 703 (1956).




Liability of abutting owner for injury from electrically charged ob-
ject near sidewalk or highway, 30 A.L.R. 1240 (1924).
Airplanes
Liability of owner of wires, poles, or structures struck by airplane for
resulting injury or damage, 48 A.L.R.2d 1462 (1956).
Breaking of Wire
Liability of electric company to one other than employee, arising from
its failure to shut off current, 32 A.L.R.2d 244 (1953).
Restoring electric current after automatic breaking of current as negli-
gence, 57 A.L.R. 1065 (1928).
Liability of one maintaining electric wire over or near highway for
injury due to breaking of wire by fall of tree or limb, 19 A.L.R. 801
(1922).
Children
Liability for injury to, or death of, child from electric wires while
climbing tree, 27 A.L.R.2d 204 (1953).
Liability for injury of child on electric transmission tower or pole, 6
A.L.R.2d 754 (1949).
Duty to guard against danger to children by electric wires, 17 A.L.R.
833 (1922), supplemented in Annot., 41 A.LR. 1337 (1926), Annot.,
49 A.L.R. 1053 (1927), and Annot., 100 A.L.R. 621 (1936).
Condition of Line or Appliance
Liability of electric light or power company for injury or damage due
to condition of service lines or electrical appliance maintained by one
to whom it furnishes electric current, 134 A.L.R. 507 (1941).
Contact with Overhead Electric Lines
Liability for injury or death resulting when pipe or other object is
manually brought into contact with electric line, 69 A.L.R.2d 9 (1960).
Liability of electric power company for injury or death resulting from
contact of crane, derrick, or other movable machine with electric line,
69 A.L.R.2d 93 (1960).
liability of owner, occupant, or operator of premises or machinery or
equipment for injury or death resulting from contact of crane, der-
rick, or other movable machine with electric line, 69 A.L.R.2d 160
(1960).
Contributory Negligence
Adult's intentional bodily contact with electrified wire as contributory
negligence, 34 A.L.R.2d 98 (1954).
Evidence
Admissibility of evidence as to experiments or tests in civil action for
death, injury, or property damage against electric power company or
the like, 54 A.L.R.2d 922 (1957).
Application of res ipsa loquitur rule in case of injury or damages from
heating unit, electrical appliance, etc., installed by defendant, 3 A.L.R.
2d 1448 (1949).
Admissibility of evidence of other accidents on issue of negligence in
respect of maintenance of electric wires, rails, etc., 81 A.L.R. 685 (1932).
Guy Wire
Liability for injury or death from electrification of guy wire, 55
A.L.R.2d 129 (1957).
Heating Device
Hospital's liability for injury to patient from heat lamp or pad or hot
water bottle, 72 A.L.R.2d 408, 418 (1960).
High Tension Lines
Liability of one maintaining high tension electric wires over private
property of another for injuries thereby inflicted, 14 A.L.R. 1023 (1921),
supplemented in Annot., 56 A.L.R. 1021 (1928).
Interruption of Service
Liability of Electric power or light company to patron for interruption,
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failure, or inadequacy of power, 4 A.L.R.3d 594 (1965).
Tort liability of third person responsible for conditions interrupting
electrical service for ensuing property damage to party receiving
service, 155 A.L.R. 209 (1945).
Landlord's Liability
Landlord's liability for personal injury or death of tenant or privies
from electrical system or equipment, 86 A.L.R.2d 838 (1962).
Lightning
Liability of electric power or telephone company for injury or dam-
age by lightning transmitted on wires, 25 A.L.R.2d 722 (1952).
Persons Injured
Liability of electric light or power company for injuries to employee
of patron, 9 A.L.R. 174 (1920).
Liability of gas or electric light or power company for injury to fire-
man, policeman, or other public employee seeking to prevent damage to
persons or property of others, 61 A.L.R. 1028 (1929).
Poles
Liability of electric power, telephone, or telegraph company for per-
sonal injury or death from fall of pole, 97 A.L.R.2d 664 (1964).
Liability of company which maintains poles for acts or omissions of
other companies using the poles under lease or license rendering
them unsafe to persons working thereon, 81 A.L.R. 415 (1932).
Sagging Wires
Duty and liability in respect of sagging of electric wire maintained
over highway, 84 A.L.R. 690 (1933).
Street Lights
Liability of municipal corporation for injury or death occurring from
defects in, or negligence in construction, operation, or maintenance of
its electric street-lighting equipment, apparatus, and the like, 19
A.L.R.2d 344 (1951).
Telephones (See also Lightning, supra)
Liability of telephone company for injury to person or damage to
property from electric current upon property on which telephone in-
strument is installed, 110 A.L.R. 1188 (1937) (annotating Fox v. Key-
stone Telephone Co., 326 Pa. 420, 192 A. 116 (1937)).
Trees (See also Children, supra)
Liability for injury or death of adult from electric wires passing
through or near trees, 40 A.L.R.2d 1299 (1955).
Liability of municipality for damage caused by fall of tree or limb
(on electric wires), 14 A.L.R.2d 186, 210 (1950).
Trespassers
Status of injured adult as a trespasser on land not owned by elec-
tricity supplier, as affecting its liability for injuries inflicted upon
him by electric wires it maintains thereon, 30 A.L.R.3rd 777 (1970).
B. Research Sources
1. 26 AM. JuR. 2d Electricity, Gas, and Steam §§ 39-194, at 245-406 (1966)
(IV. Liability for Injury or Damage from Electrical Current, Service,
Equipment, or Appliances).
2. 29 C.J.S. Electricity §§ 38-73, at 1056-1197 (1965) (VI. Injuries Inci-
dent to Production and Use).
3. 3A P.I.A.D.D. Electricity and Lighting and Power Companies at 533-622
(1965).
4. 13 P.L.E. Electricity §§ 10-17, at 150-73 (1959).
5. Vale Pennsylvania Digest, Electricity, Key numbers 12-19 (Generally,
Injuries Incident to Production and Use).
6. Challener, Injuries Incident to the Production and Use of Electricity in
Pennsylvania, 24 TEMP. L.Q. 42 (1950).
C. Trial Aids
1. Interrogatory Forms
5 BENDER'S FORMS OF INTERROGATORIES, 1-74 (1963).
2. 4 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, Electrical Injuries, 613-25 (1960).
3. 14 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, Electrical Wiring, 663-736 (1964).
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